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Ineffectiveness in 
Teacher Bargaining 
The Anatomy of a First Strike 
Philip Harris 
Peter Rausch 
and 
Samuel G. Ryan 
The objective ofthispaper is to identify characteristics which 
distinguish first strike situations from other strike actions. It is 
based on both collective bargaining and conflict resolution litera-
ture as well as the detailed analysis of a récent walkout by a public 
school teachers' union. 
One of the most frequently occurring volatile social events in American 
society is the labor union strike. From a broad perspective, such conflicts 
may bring about vital and constructive social change, but the immédiate im-
pact on the affected people and institutions can be severe. 
A particularly intriguing category of labor conflict is the first strike 
situation. An initial strike by a particular union or local is fraught with un-
certainties and contingencies which do not exist with the same intensity 
when an "experienced" union strikes. The same may be said for manage-
ment members when they are néophytes in confronting labor unrest. It is 
perhaps académie that a first strike carries with it certain unique character-
istics which may disrupt negotiations and increase the probability of de-
structive outeomes for the involved parties. Such factors hâve not, however, 
been subjected to widespread scrutiny in the literature. 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Pursuant to the above reasoning, it is the objective of this paper to 
identify characteristics which distinguish first strike situations from other 
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strike actions. Thèse characteristics are developed based on both the collec-
tive bargaining and conflict resolution literature and also through the de-
tailed analysis of a récent walkout by a public teachers' union. This was, at 
the same time, the union local's initial strike and also the first strike in the 
particular school district. It was also a case in which the union suffered seri-
ous losses which are apparently due, at least in part, to it being a first strike. 
The events in this strike are analyzed in light of the first strike characteris-
tics previously identified. This analysis is offered as preliminary argument 
on the impact of the various first strike characteristics on the bargaining 
process and the involved parties. 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
There are few sélections in the literature which specifically investigate 
the dynamics of first strike situations. Most of what has been published 
concerning teachers' strikes examines the attitudes of the parties involved 
and the particular reasons for the strikes in question. A partial review of 
thèse studies was undertaken to understand the subject so that first strike 
characteristics might eventually be identified. Among thèse is Heneman 
(1951) who measured attitudes toward unions, their policies and practices. 
The research led to the development of the University of Minnesota Em-
ployée Attitude Questionnaire (EAQ) (Uphoff and Dunnette, 1956) which 
measures attitudes of employées toward a number of job aspects including 
their work, supervision, communications, hours of work, pay, working 
conditions and co-workers. Purcell (1953) examined the dual allegiance 
which workers tend to feel toward their union and their employer. Seidman 
(1958) found that worker dissatisfaction was a necessary, but not sole con-
dition for collective action. 
More recently, Hellriegel (1970) conducted a survey of three Seattle 
school Systems in an attempt to détermine how attitudes of teachers affect 
their perceptions of the collective bargaining process. Utilizing the Purdue 
Teacher Opinionnaire (Bentley, 1967), Hellriegel concluded that: 
The possibility that some of the militancy expressed by certain respondents is a con-
séquence of their perception of school board members as being hostile toward the 
process of negotiations per se. Therefore, the ability to résolve spécifie issues may be 
compounded by the distrust or lack of acceptance which one or both parties hâve 
toward the other (pp. 395-96). 
Smith (1979), in a study of public employée attitudes, found that dissa-
tisfaction with the work situation, among other things, promoted favorable 
views toward unionism. Rybacki (1979) analyzed the conflict that occurs 
between teachers' unions and community members as a resuit of collective 
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action, and argued that "teachers' unions exist in an environment that has a 
high likelihood of inducing conflict between their membership and the in-
dividuals comprising that environment'' (p. 162). Such latent conflict mate-
rializes when a strike threatens or actually occurs. Smith further states that 
"patterns of identity-identification become deeply and bitterly entrenched, 
and prospects of conflict resolution and a return to conditions existing 
before the strike are drastically reduced" (pp. 163-64). 
Recently, Perry (1979) analyzed the bargaining processes and resulting 
contracts in nine différent public school Systems. This was a more intensive 
extension of an earlier study by the same author which examined the bar-
gaining process in public schools (Perry, 1970). In the later study, Perry 
reviewed the bargaining record in each of the school Systems since 1965. He 
found that the community was not actively interested in either the procé-
dural or substantive aspects of negotiations, and that the strike, rather than 
generating fact-finding, tended to be the basis for impasse resolution. 
When viewed collectively, the above literature tends to characterize 
teachers' unions as existing in a) hostile or, at best, indiffèrent environment, 
b) where ambiguities of fact and allegience are common, c) where the poten-
tial for distrust and conflict is high and d) where strikes and other job ac-
tions are often behaviors of choice. The probability of institutional and Per-
sonal damage in such settings is high and in the présent case, became reality. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONIZATION 
First Strike Likelihood 
The public sector is a fertile area to investigate first strike situations 
simply because public employée unionization is a more récent phenomenon 
vis-à-vis the private sector and there has been correspondingly less opportu-
nity to strike. In addition, however, there hâve been inhibiting effects of 
traditional légal and socio-moral norms which hâve viewed public unioniza-
tion and associated activities as illégal and essentially contrary to the greater 
public interest. As thèse norms either relax or are challenged by unions, the 
potential for first strikes resulting from long standing grievances would be 
expected to be high. 
The public sector is also of interest per se since the growth of public 
employée unionization has an ever-increasing impact on the environment in 
which our business, économie and social institutions operate. The contrac-
t a i agreements that resuit from labor negotiations not only define the 
wages, hours and other conditions of employment for rank-and-file mem-
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bers, but also for the surrounding work force which often use public em-
ployée gain as base criteria for its own negotiations. In addition, the prob-
lems which resuit from public sector labor conflicts, especially the more 
severe ones, such as job actions and strikes, can hâve widespread consé-
quences, often causing serious damage to the public at large. Consider the 
obvious examples of police, fire or sanitation work stoppages. 
Among the more militant public unions are those representing school 
teachers, primarily the National Education Association (which in récent 
years saw fit to abandon its no-strike policy); American Fédération of 
Teachers; and unaffiliated, predominantly single district organizations. 
Perhaps the most powerful indication of the militancy of the professional 
organizations occurred during the 1977-78 school year when no less that 145 
teacher strikes occurred in twenty-one states (Duncan, 1979). This pattern 
will probably continue, given the Proposition 13 initiatives and fiscal aus-
terity postures which are évident across the nation. Thèse adversities will 
likely cause the affected employées to unify and take assertive action as a 
matter of self-interest and survival. 
Therefore, public sector labor-management relations offers both a high 
likelihood of strikes in gênerai and of first strike situations in particular. 
There is a need for research which will contribute to an increased under-
standing of the dynamics of situations, specifically, first strikes. Insight 
gained may lead to more constructive negotiations and outcomes in the 
future. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST STRIKES 
The paucity of writings specifically dealing with the first strike situa-
tions lead, in the présent study, to a survey of the gênerai social psychology / 
behavioral management conflict literature to aid in the identification of first 
strike characteristics. Prevailing models of conflict and conflict manage-
ment propose that conflict behavior is a function of two primary antécédent 
conditions. Thèse are perceived inter-party incompatibility and interdepen-
dence between the parties (Boulding, 1962; Katz & Kahn, 1978; March & 
Simon, 1958; Ryan, 1977; Schmidt & Kochan, 1972; Thomas, 1979). Ac-
cording to thèse views, the greater the number of issues that are seen as in-
compatible, the greater the potential for overt conflict behavior, in this 
case, a strike. 
Of key importance to a strike situation, where contact and communica-
tion between the parties is extremely guarded, is the perceptions of each side 
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concerning the positions and intent of the other. It has been repeatedly de-
monstrated that certain incompatible perceptions both of opposing parties 
and of the prevailing environment can materially increase the occurrence of 
conflict of behavior. Some of thèse factors seem particularly applicable to 
first strikes and thus form the bases for characterizing such situations. 
1. Parties in first strike situations are likely to hâve less knowledge, expéri-
ence and perspective on which to base their expectations and décisions. It 
would be expected, therefore, that such parties would expérience more 
uncertainty and ambiguity, leading to less stable perceptions and, thus, 
"irrational" conflict behavior. 
2. Néophytes in a strike are also more likely to mistrust the other party since 
there is little perspective as to the impact of negotiation behavior. 
3. First strike parties would be expecied to act more often based on émotion 
than experienced strikers. Intense, almost religious involvement in the 
feared job action is more likely. 
4. First strike parties are more likely to feel vulnérable and défensive since 
they lack prior expérience. This can lead to more aggressive behavior to 
overcome self-doubt. 
5. Parties involved in their first strike are less likely to be able to secure high 
quality assistance, both légal and otherwise. This can exacerbate the ef-
fects of lack of knowledge and mistrust. 
6. Finally, first strike situations are more likely to suffer from poor com-
munications both between and among the parties, thus heightening the 
misperceptions and ambiguities which prevail. 
In summary, first strike situations appear to offer a higher potential 
for less stable negotiations, more intense feelings, poor communications, 
more défensive/aggressive behaviors and actual strike actions. The follow-
ing case analysis is offered as a démonstration of classic first strike be-
havior. 
A CASE STUDY OF A FIRST STRIKE 
The particular job action studied hère is a public school teachers' strike 
which occurred recently in a suburban community of a large northeastern 
city. 
The reported information was gathered from public records of the 
strike and, intriguingly, from personal conversations with eight union lead-
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ers and several key union figures who made disclosures upon promise of 
confidentiality. No member of the school board would agrée to discuss the 
strike. It is therefore a caveat emptor to the reader that no information or 
opinion of a non-public nature from the school board is included. Since the 
spécifie interest of this paper is the attitudes and behavior of the union, this 
lack of school board input should not be critically damaging to the study's 
completeness or objectivity. 
One might question the justification for studying another strike such as 
this, given the numerous teachers' strikes which hâve been documented in 
the literature. There are, however, certain characteristics which make this 
particular action rather unique and set it apart from the average teachers' 
strike. 
One major factor is that this was both the union local's first strike and 
the town's first teachers' strike. Second, the strike was relatively violent in 
nature. Third, the union was extremely ineffective in its bargaining activi-
des and made many costly mistakes. 
The analysis of the key events and apparent causes of this job action 
may lead to a better understanding of the particular dynamics of first strike 
bargaining processes and, perhaps, to more constructive resolution alterna-
tives in ail strike situations. 
THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS 
The teachers' union and the board of éducation had their first meeting 
in the early fall, nine months before the existing contract was to expire. At 
this meeting both parties presented their initial séries of demands. Al-
though, the content and character of the proposais of each party are impor-
tant to acquire a feeling for the negotiation climate, there were many offers 
and counter-offers at various stages of the negotiations. To list each group 
of demands in this text would yield a cumbersome narrative both overly 
complex and disruptive of the flow of thought. 
For thèse reasons, the numerous spécifie offers and counter-offers of 
the parties are listed separately in Appendix A, and are referred to as neces-
sary in the text. 
As a beginning to the negotiation process, the initial demands of the 
parties give a feeling for the extent of their différences, the kinds of issues 
involved and set the stage for subséquent bargaining. 
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As might be expected, both parties reacted negatively to each other's 
initial proposai with strong disagreement on almost every issue. 
According to the union, the school board's proposai constituted a to-
tally unacceptable overall réduction in total benefits. Indeed, it is true that 
the only proposed benefit in addition to the existing contract was the offer 
for increased retirement compensation based upon unused sick leave. The 
board of éducation, in turn, was unwilling to accept any part of the union's 
proposai. 
Negotiations continued with bargaining sessions scheduled about twice 
a month. On several occasions the union indicated that it was somewhat 
flexible in its demands for a pay raise and in the amount and timing of the 
proposed additional fringe benefits. The board offered to drop its demand 
for restrictions of tuition reimbursements for cases involving job-related 
degree programs. Otherwise, it remained steadfast in its refusai to negotiate 
on other issues and essentially stuck to its initial offer. 
Consequently, almost five months after the negotiations had begun, 
and with no great change in the parties' positions, impasse was declared. 
The state responded immediately by appointing a fact-finder to study and 
report on the impasse. Although both of the negotiating parties had the 
right to approve the sélection of the fact-finder, neither party was obligated 
to abide by any recommendations that might be made. 
As soon as the union and the school board had agreed upon the fact-
finder, hearings were scheduled to présent the positions of both sides. After 
analyzing the two sets of proposais and accompanying arguments, the fact-
finder delivered his report and made the recommendations which are detail-
ed in Appendix A. 
Negotiations resumed, and both the union and the school board modi-
fied their proposais as a resuit of the fact-finder's recommendations. Thèse 
modifications represented the first significant revisions made by either party 
since the negotiations began six months before, and are also listed in Ap-
pendix A. 
It can be seen that the school board essentially accepted ail of the fact-
finder's recommendations, even surpassing the salary increase recommen-
dations. The union made small modifications on two issues but remained 
adament on the others, claiming that thèse were the keys to any possible 
contract settlement. 
The negotiations continued on an intermittent schedule through the 
summer, but neither side was willing to make further concessions towards a 
contract agreement. 
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The union held its first gênerai membership meeting of the new school 
year at the end of September. The agenda included a report to the rank-and-
file on the status of the contract negotiations, and a discussion of the possi-
ble courses of action that might be taken by the union to break the dead-
lock. A vote taken at the end of the meeting showed that more than 95 per-
cent of those in attendance favored a teachers' strike if the deadlock conti-
nued, despite the fact that such action would violate state law. 
Proceeding into the month of October both parties, prompted by the 
prospect of possible job actions, agreed to hire a mediator to assist them in 
reaching a settlement. A mediator acceptable to both sides was selected by 
the middle of the month and began participating in the negotiations. De-
spite the efforts of the mediator, the month of November marked the begin-
ning of the second year of negotiations with no contract settlement in sight. 
The state was set for the crisis that would shortly erupt. 
In retrospect, two factors are évident during the preliminary negotia-
tions stage which suggest that the naivete of the union's first strike stratégies 
may hâve seriously weakened its bargaining position. 
First, some previous expérience on the union bargaining team could 
hâve markedly helped the situation. During the summer the union was in a 
very advantageous position with the new school year coming up. Had the 
union threatened and prepared for an immédiate job action on the first day 
of the school year, it could hâve had considérable leverage at the summer 
bargaining table. It would not hâve been possible for the skeleton summer 
staff of the school board to make contingency plans as effectively as after 
school started and the board was again fully staffed. The union, however, 
in this first strike situation failed to seize the opportunity and paid a consid-
érable price for ignorance later on. 
Another factor which weakened the union was the absence of state af-
filiate involvement until very late in the bargaining. According to Duncan 
(1979), ' 'a strike décision usually involves some combination of the 
resources of local, state, and national (union) organizations". This was not 
the situation in the présent case. It is, in fact, surprising that the state 
organization did not provide more immédiate support to this local while 
facing the growing possibility of a first strike. 
THE PRE-STRIKE PERIOD 
The teachers' union decided to take the initiative in a final attempt to 
force a break in the deadlocked negotiations and bring about a contract set-
tlement. Bolstered by the nearly unanimous vote of confidence demonstra-
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ted by the poil of the rank-and-file, the union issued an open letter to ail 
parents in the school System. This letter contained a statement of the teach-
ers' unhappiness over the lack of a contract agreement, and identified pub-
licly for the first time what they considered to be some of the central issues 
in the negotiations. The union executive committee had discussed many of 
the issues with its rank-and-file, but only at meetings which are restricted to 
union members. The letter set a one week deadline to reach a contract seule-
ment. Although no definite action was threatened if an agreement was not 
reached by that date, the letter warned that the responsibility for the consé-
quences would rest with the board of éducation. 
This was a very unusual step for the union to take. As Perry (1979) 
reports in his study of nine différent school Systems, "few of the protago-
nists reported any serious efforts to enlist the support of community groups 
in the negotiation context'\ Yet hère we see the teachers' union making a 
first serious attempt to attract the sympathy and support of the parents in 
the community. This is just one more incident that makes this particular 
strike unique, and it was a particularly significant gamble on the part of the 
union. 
Perry (1979) goes on the conclude, "Collective bargaining in most Sys-
tems was a remarkable private and apolitical process." He reports that 
"there were a few isolated cases of community relations efforts" in his stud-
ies, "but those, too, were not designed or used to stratégie advantage in bar-
gaining." In the présent instance the teachers' union was clearly straying 
from the norm in issuing its open letter. 
Another significant fact was that the union's letter specifically stated 
that the board's offer of salary increases was only "slightiy more than 2 per-
cent", and was decried as a pittance in the fight to keep up with inflation. 
This was an outright lie. The school board's last offer was actually six per-
cent and not two percent as reported in the letter. So even, though the 
board's offer would not permit the teachers to keep up with inflation, the 
amount of the offer reported in the union's letter was an apparently deliber-
ate misrepresentation of the facts. 
This was the first attempt by either party to take advantage of the se-
crecy of the negotiations and mislead the public for the purpose of gaining 
sympathy and support. Actually, it was discovered after the crisis was over 
that the public was not the only group that was misled by the union regard-
ing the status of the negotiations. The union members themselves were also 
given false information by the union leaders prior to the strike. This was ap-
parently an attempt by the leaders to provoke the union members and make 
them more willing to support a stand against the school board. Whether 
914 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
such prévarication was due to poor judgment, naivete, lack of sound advice 
or a deliberate militant move, it appears quite likely that the union's first 
strike status may hâve led it to take actions that it otherwise might recon-
sider. 
The school board was reportedly caught off guard by the union's letter 
and reacted quickly in an attempt to avert a public outcry in support of the 
union. An immédiate request was sent to the mediator, who had been parti-
cipating in the negotiations, to begin scheduling more fréquent bargaining 
sessions. A written rebuttal of each of the claims made in the union's letter 
was also drafted and prepared for public distribution. The school board 
also made some significant modifications to its proposai, listed in Appendix 
A, and presented them at the next negotiating session. 
Thèse modifications by the school board represented the first signifi-
cant changes to take place since the fact-finder's report was delivered six 
months earlier. It was the opinion of the union officers at the time that this 
letter had directly forced the board's response, and that the way may hâve 
been opened to possible seulement. It is possible hère that the school 
board's first strike posture may hâve lead it to be too lenient at an inoppor-
tune time. 
The negotiating session at which the new proposais were presented last-
ed six hours. The union was very much interested in the benefits for the spé-
cial éducation teachers, but the parties could not reach any agréeraient con-
cerning the elementary préparation time issue. The talks recessed until the 
foliowing day. 
When the bargaining resumed, it was immediately apparent that posi-
tions of both sides had hardened again. The union demanded additional 
concessions with respect to the salary offer for the spécial éducation teach-
ers. The board refused, claiming that it felt that its offer for médical cover-
age for this group was more than generous. Also, despite the board's offer 
to discuss the question of elementary préparation time, it would not give in 
on its refusai to provide this time during the regular work day. 
The school board met the following day in a spécial closed-door emer-
gency session, ostensibly to discuss the negotiations. It was subsequently 
learned that the board actually met to finalize emergency plans in prépara-
tion for a possible strike. Thèse préparations included: a. the compilation of 
a large list of available substitute teachers who might be hired in order that 
the schools be kept open during a strike. b. provisions to delay the bus 
schedules so that the schools could be opened late on the morning of a strike 
to permit implementation of the other contingency plans before the students 
arrived. c. préparation of alternate class schedules and student rosters so 
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that courses could be Consolidated and combined for more effective control 
during a strike. d. plans for briefing ail administrative personnel in order to 
define their emergency duties and responsibilities. 
The school board was now in a position to implement thèse procédures 
very quickly at the first sign of a teachers' strike. 
Following this meeting, the président of the board of éducation re-
leased a letter to ail school System employées in response to the union's let-
ter of the week before. The letter outlined the board's contract proposai, in-
cluding the salary offer, and alleged that the mediator was disappointed 
with the union's response to the board's offer. This accusation was, accord-
ing to a union source, not without basis and had a damaging effect on the 
public's attitude towards the union*s position as evidenced by newspaper ar-
ticles and citizen interviews. The letter also warned of the personal financial 
losses which hâve historically been incurred by those who participate in 
work stoppages. 
The union blasted the school board's letter as a total distortion. In an 
interview given the day after the letter was released, a high-ranking union 
officiai stated that the letter "does not contain the whole truth", and claim-
ed that "the board had been quite sélective in what it had chosen to reveal." 
Commenting on the charge that the mediator was disappointed with the 
union's response to the board's offer, the union officiai denied any know-
ledge of it and declared, "I consider it in absolute bad faith for either party 
to reveal anything that a mediator has said, since what he says to us is said 
in absolute confidence." It should be noted that the officiai did not specifi-
cally deny that the mediator was displeased with the union. 
Negotiations were reconvened by the mediator, and the school board 
increased its salary offer from six to six and three-tenths percent, which was 
offered for each year of a three-year agreement. The teachers moved from 
nine to eight and one-half percent and reduced their demands for prépara-
tion time from two and one-half to two hours. The parties progressed no 
further, and on the day set by the union in their letter, the teachers struck. 
THE STRIKE 
At the onset of the strike, the board implemented its emergency plans. 
For the duration of the two-week walkout student attendance was about fif-
ty percent. A temporary injunction to hait the strike was obtained by the 
board and was ignored by the teachers. For this, eight members of the union 
executive committee were sent to jail for the second week of the strike. The 
union was fined $2,500 per day for the same period. 
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The most obvious évidence of the intense polarized émotions présent in 
the rank-and-file was the violence that occurred during the strike. 
In school there were reports of bicycle riding in the halls and fire extin-
guishers being emptied in the classrooms. There were food fights in the 
cafétérias, and at least one person was seriously hurt when hit in the head by 
a flying béer bottle. On the picket lines teachers blocked the entrances to the 
schools and engaged in physical scuffles to turn away students and school 
employées. The teachers also talked many of the students into joining them 
in the picket lines. There were several instances of teachers using abusive 
language over bullhorns to disturb and disrupt the classes in progress until 
the police confiscated the bullhorns. A crowd of about 200 teachers assem-
bled to picket at one school, and there were a number of fistfights between 
thèse marchers and the substitute teachers arriving for work. At one point, 
several had to use clubs to break up the melee. 
Many of the people reporting to work in the schools were pelted with 
eggs from the picket lines, and several policemen were also hit. Several 
classrooms had to be evacuated when a smoke bomb was tossed into a 
window. 
There was considérable damage done to several cars in the school park-
ing lots. Many of the substitute teachers, as well as a number of other 
school employées, reported that their tires had been slashed and their wind-
shields had been broken while they were in school. Several cars had also 
been splashed with paint. Police guards were stationed in ail the school 
parking lots to prevent any further damage. 
Certain behavior of the adversaries further exacerbated the conflict. 
Members of the school board charged that the strike was being orchestrated 
by the statewide union organization and that the majority of the strikes had 
been called against schools with black students (the student population in 
this school System was predominantly black). This allégation was quickly 
denied by a state union bargaining officiai, who said that the local teachers 
had made the décision to strike on their own. 
For its part, the union counter-charged that the board encouraged its 
outside negotiator to protract the negotiations process despite the added 
cost of this to taxpayers. 
Throughout the strike, negotiations were conducted with fréquent on-
again, off-again prospects for seulement. Involved at one time or another 
were the mediator, parents' councils, citizens' committees, public officiais 
and the judge issuing the injunction. The adversaries themselves announced 
and conducted numerous caucuses, both publicly and privately. Newspaper 
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ads were published by both sides presenting their positions, and a téléphone 
barrage was directed toward people who could conceivably influence the 
strike and its seulement. 
Overall, the strike was a disruptive, turbulent period which caused 
great concern in the community and among many of the union rank-and-
file. The school board, however, remained firm, and the initial union ré-
solve began to diminish sharply in the face of the grim realities of the strike. 
THE SETTLEMENT 
Exactly two weeks after the strike began a tentative contract settlement 
was announced. The latest talks had taken place in the county jail where the 
union officers were being held for ignoring the court-order injunction to 
end the strike. When the agreement was announced, neither party would 
reveal any détails of the new contract until it could be ratified by the union 
members. The union ratification meeting later that same day was a highly 
emotional session. 
The jailed officers were cheered as they entered the hall, members tear-
fully embraced and an intense feeling of cohésion and solidarity prevailed. 
This emotional crest maintained for several months following the settlement 
and tended to override and obscure members' candid feelings concerning 
the strike. The officers assumed hero status in the eyes of the membership 
and the président realized a new level of personal influence. 
The terms of the final settlement concerning the major bargaining 
issues are listed in Appendix A. As can be seen, there were some gains 
achieved by the union. Most significantly, the addition of major fringe 
benefits (the dental plan, the prescription plan and the application of un-
used sick leave at retirement) in one contract period made bargaining his-
tory for teachers' unions in that state. 
On balance however, it is apparent that the union lost the "war". This 
is particularly évident when one views comparative history of the parties' 
positions on the major contract issues at three important stages of the nego-
tiations as is shown in Table 1. Thèse data contrast the initial offers, the sta-
tus immédiately before the strike and the final settlement. From this com-
parison the change or lack of change of positions of parties on the major 
issues is clarified. 
It is clear that the offers on the table immediately prior to the strike are 
extremely similar to the final settlement. Any small différences that do exist 
could surely hâve been won in negotiation if the union had reduced the dis-
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10. Personal leave 
11. Advance notice 
on assignments 
12. Médical 
insurance 
13. Binding 
arbitration 
14. Tuition reim-
bursement 
15. Special-teacher 
bonus 
16. Special-teacher 
extra assign-
ments 
17. Unused sick 
leave 
18. Term of 
contract 
Severe restrictions 
None 
Allocate portion of 
cost to teachers 
Status quo 
Severe restrictions 
Eliminate 
Status quo 
Maximum $2,500 
at retirement 
Status quo 
Prior to school year 
Status quo 
Include disciplinary 
reprimands 
Status quo 
Status quo 
Eliminate 
2 years 
Severe restrictions 
June first 
of each year 
Status quo 
3 years 
Some restrictions 
June first 
of each year 
Status quo 
Include disciplinary 
reprimands 
Status quo 
Status quo 
Eliminate 
Maximum $2,500" 
at retirement 
3 years 
Pending state law removed this issue from collective bargaining. 
Three major fringes in one contract period was unique in state bargaining history to that time. 
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parity between its demands and the school board's offers. Perhaps even 
more gains could hâve been achieved. In any case, considering the fines and 
loss of pay, it can hardly be argued that the strike actually resulted in sub-
stantial gain for the union with respect to the contract issues. Indeed, after 
the ratification, the président of the union conceded that it was going to be 
much too long before the money lost in salaries to be made up by the in-
creases they had won. But he also added, "There cornes a time when you 
hâve to stand up and be counted. You hâve to stand up for what you believe 
in, and I happen to believe in justice." 
STRIKE AFTERMATH 
Union leaders and several other teachers who were interviewed after 
the strike said that "the lack of respect shown by the board toward them, 
along with a lack of adéquate response by the union, led to unrest and dissa-
tisfaction which could only be expressed by a dramatic job action." Fur-
thermore, they felt that the union's biggest mistake was that it waited until 
November to strike. It felt that if it had been called when the school year 
commenced, the board would hâve had less time to prépare, thereby in-
creasing the strike's impact. 
There was some disagreement, however, over whether the strike could 
hâve been avoided. Some of the teachers questioned felt that the union had 
not exhausted ail of its options before calling the strike, including such job 
actions as a refusai to work beyond specified school hours. This would hâve 
effectively eliminated staff meetings, parent conférences and extra-curricu-
lar activities. Also, union démonstrations at school board meetings could 
hâve been organized. Thèse teachers also felt that the union should hâve 
been more flexible by giving in more. 
None of the union officiais or other teachers interviewed felt that the 
students suffered significantly during the strike. As one teacher stated, 
"Any time lost from school is really only a vacation for the kids, and usual-
ly insignificant when considered in the context of an entire year's worth of 
material." 
The teachers were asked what advice they had for others involved in 
similar situations. The two items which were stressed by ail of them were the 
need for bargaining expertise and the importance of union solidarity. 
Everyone agreed that it was absolutely essential for the union to hâve 
hired an experienced professional negotiator to présent its position. Al-
though the state union organization did make its own negotiator available 
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to the local union for bargaining, it was felt that this person was no match 
for the caliber of professional negotiator employed by the school board. 
Regarding union solidarity, members felt that "without the unanimous 
support of the union members, bargaining leverage is considérable reduced, 
and no job action can be effective." When asked how this unity can be fos-
tered, the responses included the need for active représentatives, participa-
tory meetings and, as was true in this case, a union leader with charisma. 
They further observed that given current law, the school board holds 
ail the power. If, despite good faith negotiations and valid arguments by the 
union, the board refuses to meet union demands, the union has no choice 
within that state's légal framework but to accept the board's last offer. 
Other lessons which were learned from this strike included "just how 
far the board was willing to go to get its own way", the fact that "union 
solidarity was very high when the chips were down", and that "teachers 
lose the most in a strike". Several of the teachers even felt that the school 
board actually wins in a strike, since it only loses the taxpayers' money. As 
one teacher bitterly stated, "Even if the union wins a couple of contract 
points, in the long run the teachers lose anyway, since they are always un-
derpaid." 
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE STRIKE 
Trying to intelligently assess the true causes of the strike, the actual 
feelings and intentions of the involved parties or even the facts of the situa-
tion given the qualitative observational methods used hère, is a task frought 
with spéculation, inference, incomplète data and séparation of truth, false-
hood and irrelevance. Despite thèse acknowledged constraints, it is interest-
ing that the rank-and-file reactions were consistend with the findings of 
prior research. The teachers hère did mistrust the school board and perceive 
it as hostile (Hellriegel, 1970): they did face an environment with a high like-
lihood of conflict (Rybacki, 1979); they did utilize a strike to résolve an im-
passe before fully exhausting alternative mechanisms (Perry, 1979); and fi-
nally they felt isolated by a combination of public indifférence/hostility and 
unfavorable légal constraints (Rybacki, 1979; Smith, 1979). They also suf-
fered severe and costly losses in the strike. 
The comparison in Table 1 of the settlement and the immédiate pre-
strike positions demonstrates dramatically that very little gain was made by 
the union during the strike. Certainly the cost of the expérience far out-
weighed the objective gains. Of the eighteen issues listed in Table 1, the 
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school board can be seen as the outright winner on seven of them (numbers 
1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11) including the crucial salary and time issues. The union 
can be seen to hâve prevailed in nine instances but in four of thèse (numbers 
3, 12, 14, 15) they merely survived a threatened réduction by the board. The 
union did gain three major fringe benefits (items 7, 8, 17) which was unique 
to that date in the state. Thèse gains, however, were small solice in the face 
of the losses. It is also apparent, as noted above, that the union's ineffec-
tiveness during the negotiations was a major cause of its own injury. 
There are a number of reasons for thèse outcomes. 1. The leadership of 
the union was new and inexperienced in the bargaining process. None of the 
union negotiating team had ever before even participated in a contract bar-
gaining session, much less a strike. As a resuit, there was no one on the bar-
gaining team that the union leaders could turn to for some maturity of judg-
ment based upon previous expérience in similar situations. 2. According to 
Duncan (1979), "teachers' unions that strike are typically well organized, 
and there leadership... is highly trained." This was not the situation in this 
case. One of the more critical mistakes made by this union was the failure to 
accurately judge the extent to which the board of éducation was willing to 
go to attain its goals. Had the union leaders been more highly trained and 
experienced they would hâve been better able to assess the character and 
détermination of the school board. It is also probable that a more experi-
enced, highly trained leadership would hâve been perceived in a différent, 
more predictable, more compétent, perhaps more powerful light by the 
school board. This may hâve caused the school board to adopt a more con-
ciliatory stance. 3. Another reason for the union's ineffectiveness was its 
lack of gênerai preparedness for a strike or its reasonable conséquences. 
The union décision to strike seemed a relatively sudden impulse that was 
spurred by a continued deadlock in the negotiations, and not a carefully 
prepared job action. The union never expected the school board would be 
so rigid and harsh in its willingness to allow a strike, successfully keep 
schools open, impose partisan actions and effectively break the union 
down. This was a serious miscalculation, heightened by the fact that offi-
cers and rank-and-file alike were admittedly "swept up in the émotions of 
the thing". Egos of the officers had to become involved. Due partially to in-
adéquate bargaining expérience, poor control and inadéquate légal repré-
sentation, they were outmaneuvered at negotiations. They were subsequent-
ly punished by the law during the strike and gave in for little more than they 
already had gained before the strike. 4. Duncan (1979) reports that "a 
teachers' union which décides to strike in a given school district usually 
must dévote considérable time, energy, and resources to 'hyping' its rank-
and-file." Conversely in this case, the union leaders deliberately lied to the 
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rank-and-file in a successful attempt to quickly arouse them for a strike ac-
tion. The most glaring example of this was the fact that the membership-at-
large did not know that the board had made its first salary offer increase 
(from 2% to 6%) until the entire summer had passed and the parties were 
preparing to strike. This and several other similar incidents seem also to in-
dicate that the union officers had private motives which were not being ex-
pressed even to their own constituents. 5. It was also true that each of the 
negotiating parties believed that the other had a hidden agenda which con-
tributed to the crisis situation. The union was certain that the professional 
negotiator hired by the board was directed to prolong the bargaining. The 
school board, on the other hand, was convinced that the state union organi-
zation selected certain school districts each year to be pushed to the limit 
during negotiations in order to raise contract norms. According to one 
teacher, this school board believed that this local had been selected for such 
a purpose that year. It is true that the state headquarters did pay ail the 
fines imposed for violating the state's no-strike law. Whether or not thèse 
claims were true, it is obvious that both parties believed them, and that this 
belief had a significant effect on the negotiations as evidenced by the belli-
gerent postures of both sides. 6. The union's actions were largely neutral-
ized by extremely poor timing. The union leaders had ample time within 
which to read the tone of the negotiations and make décisions. However, by 
the time the union actually decided to strike the school board had formu-
lated complète contingency plans that would allow it to resist a strike and 
continue opérations on a long term basis. Perry (1979) found that only one 
in five school districts attempted to open the schools during a first strike, 
and not one of the school boards in the nine représentative school Systems 
he studied sought légal sanctions or injunctions against unions during a first 
strike. Not only did the school board take such légal action in this particular 
strike, but it also kept the schools open for the duration. Once the strike was 
imminent the school board held the power in ail key areas and simply waited 
until the union capitulated. Thèse factors, certainly a partial function of the 
fact that this was the first strike in the history of the school System, led the 
union to blunder its way into a drastic situation it could not hope to win. 
There were also négative effects on the school board. Most significant-
ly, the superintendent resigned several months after the strike due to the in-
tense resentment, angry phone calls and other harassment from union 
sources. 
Two short and not unrelated postscripts are helpful hère. First is the 
very apprehensive outlook for the next round of negotiations when the cur-
rent contract expires. The sores and wounds of the présent expérience will 
require enormous energy to control and channel towards constructive nego-
tiations. 
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Secondly, the mistrust and resentment which was left behind by the 
strike was powerfully demonstrated when the présent authors approached 
the union officers with a proposai to survey member attitudes. Although the 
union président was enthusiastic and seemed to honestly désire and analysis 
of such data, the proposai was soundly defeated by a vote of the union ex-
ecutive committee. The main reason reported for the vote included fear of 
stirring up the rank-and-file, not mistrust as to the security of the data. Al-
though the above scénario is not new to researchers in organizations, it is 
évidence of the négative climate which remains stirring in this union. 
APPROACHING THE FIRST STRIKE SITUATION 
It seems apparent that the first strike characteristics derived earlier 
were présent in this case. Misperceptions, lack of trust, lack of knowledge 
and proper professional représentation, dismal interparty communication, 
out-and-out lying to the rank-and-file, highly emotional evolvement and 
unstable, aggressive behavior ail are évident. 
It is also in fairness true that many of thèse characteristics arise in "ex-
perienced" strikes and are not soley a function of naivete. They do, how-
ever, hâve a higher probability of occurrence in a first strike with corre-
sponding destructive conséquences. 
Based on the above factors, it is possible to specify a séries of actions 
which might be recommended to parties facing a first strike situation. 
First, the parties should realize that they are at least in an adversary 
situation where ail of the goals of either party will not be met. Some com-
promise, probably extensive, must be made. 
Secondly, naive parties should secure the best professional représenta-
tion available. This will help to lessen uncertainty and ambiguity and pro-
vide a more clear communication avenue with the opposition. In addition, 
the expérience and skill of such représentation can help defuse aggressive 
tendencies and focus attention on stratégies and behavior that hâve the 
greatest apparent probability of achieving desired goals. 
Third, parties should educate themselves to the intricacies of strike 
situations. The professional représentative can be a resource as can the 
union headquarters, as well as other unions which hâve undergone strikes in 
the past. 
Finally, the parties should realize that the immédiate strike situation is 
not the last time they will hâve to negotiate. In the présent case, the resid-
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uals which followed the strike caused lingering rank-and-file resentment 
toward the school board, érosion of confidence in union officers, disrup-
tion of the school board, extensive individual damage and very little in the 
way of positive outcomes. 
It is the case that powerful, knowledgeable parties stand the best 
chance of securing the most that is available in a negotiation or potential 
strike situation. First strikes, therefore, may hâve their greatest value in 
painfully demonstrating how not to negotiate a contract. 
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L'analyse de la première grève d'un syndicat d'enseignants 
Dans l'étude et la pratique de la négociation collective, on se heurte toujours à 
la possibilité d'une grève qui peut être potentiellement néfaste. Lorsque, de plus, les 
parties sont des novices dans l'art de négocier et qu'elles font face à un état de grève 
pour la première fois, il est probable qu'elles auront un comportement qui laisse à 
désirer et qui peut conduire à des résultats désastreux. 
Cette étude traite spécifiquement d'une «première grève» et propose une série 
de faits qui caractérisent de pareilles situations. Ces facteurs sont ensuite utilisés dans 
l'analyse des événements qui entourent une grève dans le secteur de l'enseignement 
où les deux parties, le syndicat et la commission scolaire, en étaient à leur première 
expérience. 
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'une première grève, on peut s'attendre à ce que, comparés à 
des négociateurs plus expérimentés, les responsables de la négociation soient (1) 
moins bien informés et plus hésitants, ce qui conduit à une perception moins nette 
des événements et à un comportement irrationnel; (2) qu'ils se montrent méfiants à 
l'endroit des autres parties; (3) qu'ils s'appuient sur des raisons émotives; (4) qu'ils 
adoptent une attitude défensive et agressive; (5) qu'ils optent pour des modes de 
communication inadéquats; (6) qu'ils aient recours à des aides professionnels moins 
compétents, ce qui a pour effet d'accroître les autres difficultés. 
L'examen de ce qui s'est passé au cours de cette grève d'enseignants a révélé 
que, d'une façon générale, le syndicat a subi des préjudices graves et inutiles comme 
résultat de sa décision de faire la grève, en obtenant qu'un petit peu plus que ce que 
lui avait offert la commission scolaire immédiatement avant la grève. Des communi-
cations réticentes et sélectives, alors que l'une et l'autre parties jouaient à cache-
cache, le manque de conseils à la section locale de la part du siège social du syndicat, 
la négligence des dirigeants syndicaux à renseigner les membres sur des faits impor-
tants qui se rapportaient directement au conflit comme les offres salariales, des er-
reurs dans la stratégie de négociation qui ont placé le syndicat dans une situation 
désavantageuse, des attitudes de plus en plus émotives et agressives entre les parties 
au fur et à mesure que les négociations se poursuivaient, autant de faits qui ont ca-
ractérisé ces négociations. Le syndicat laissa passer la période la plus propice à la grè-
ve au commencement de l'automne au moment de l'ouverture des classes alors que la 
commission scolaire était moins prête à affronter la grève. 
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La grève elle-même fut assez violente; elle a laissé de profonds ressentiments et 
une méfiance prolongée entre les parties. Les dirigeants syndicaux ont été emprison-
nés une semaine pendant la grève. Les cours furent perturbés et les policiers furent 
forcés de maîtriser les grévistes. Les membres en général furent surpris par la dureté 
de la grève et par la fermeté de la commission scolaire à maintenir sa position. Le 
président de la commission scolaire remet peu après sa démission à cause d'animosité 
et de pressions sous forme d'appels téléphoniques outranciers, de lettres haineuses et 
d'altercation publique avec les membres du syndicat. 
Les événements et les expériences qui ont marqué cette grève diffèrent de la plu-
part des grèves d'enseignants qui ont été analysées jusqu'ici, ce qui indique que les 
premières grèves méritent une étude spéciale en tant que forme originale de conflits 
qui possèdent leurs caractéristiques et leurs dynamisme propres. 
On peut donc conclure que les parties à une première grève devraient se rendre 
compte de la probabilité plus forte des dangers dont il vient d'être question et qu'el-
les devraient mieux se préparer aux réalités de la négociation collective, se doter 
d'une aide professionnelle compétente, être prêtes à faire des compromis et être 
conscientes des effets prolongés de comportements néfastes pour les négociations 
futures. 
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